

## Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 169606

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, BR

SUBJECT: CYPRUS CRISIS, CONSULTATIONS WITH BRAZIL

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING LETTER FROM  
SECRETARY KISSINGER TO FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA.
2. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR ANTONIO: IN VIEW OF YOUR STRONG  
INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MEDITERRANEAN, I THOUGHT I  
WOULD GIVE YOU MY ASSESSMENT OF THE CYPRUS SITUATION AS WELL  
AS THE CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING OUR POLICIES.
3. THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS OUR AIMS HAVE BEEN: (1) TO PRE-  
VENT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY, (2) TO  
KEEP OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL  
GOVERNMENT IN CYPRUS, AND (3) TO PREVENT THE INTERNATIONAL-  
IZATION OF THE CONFLICTS THROUGH DEEPENED SOVIET INVOLVE-  
MENT. AT THE OUTSET OF THE CRISIS, I TOOK A DELIBERATE  
DECISION TO AVOID MORAL JUDGMENTS ABOUT GREEK INVOLVEMENT  
IN THE CYPRUS COUP, TO TAKE NO SIDE IN THE DEVELOPING

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CONFRONTATION BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY, BUT INSTEAD TO USE

U.S. INFLUENCE TO MEDIATE. I WANTED TO MAINTAIN COMPLETE FLEXIBILITY TO PREVENT THE FREEZING OF POSITIONS BY ANY OF THE PARTIES AND TO INDUCE THE GREEKS AND THE TURKS TO COME INDEPENDENTLY TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT WAS IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS TO NEGOTIATE THEIR DIFFERENCES

PEACEFULLY.

4. THUS, WHEN THE CYPRUS COUP OCCURRED, THE US EXPRESSED ITS CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN CYPRUS. FROM THE OUTSET OF THE CRISIS, WE CONTINUED TO REGARD MAKARIOS AS THE DE JURE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS. AT THE SAME TIME WE HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT SAMPSON HAD DE FACTO CONTROL ON THE GROUND, ALTHOUGH WE NEVER CONTEMPLATED RECOGNIZING HIS GOVERNMENT. WE GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SITUATION SHOULD BE AVOIDED. WE ARE NOW CONDUCTING OUR RELATIONS WITH CLERIDES WHO, AS YOU KNOW, IS SERVING AS ACTING PRESIDENT AS PROVIDED BY THE CYPRUS CONSTITUTION. AS FOR THE FUTURE, I BELIEVE THAT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN OVERALL CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, THE PEOPLE OF CYPRUS THEMSELVES MUST DECIDE WHO IS TO BE THEIR PRESIDENT.

5. REGARDING TURKEY, THE UK AND THE US EXERTED STRENUOUS DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO PREVENT TURKISH INTERVENTION. THOSE ATTEMPTS FAILED, HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE GREEK-LED COUP HAD CHANGED THE BALANCE OF FORCES ON THE ISLAND AND THAT IT COULD HAVE NO CONFIDENCE IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING CYPRUS AS LONG AS THAT BALANCE WAS DISRUPTED. THUS, WHEN THE INTERVENTION OCCURRED, WE, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH, BENT ALL OUR EFFORTS TOWARD A PROMPT CEASEFIRE. UNDER SECRETARY SISCO, AS YOU KNOW, SHUTTLED BETWEEN ATHENS AND ANKARA TO ARRANGE A CEASEFIRE AND FROM WASHINGTON I WAS IN INTENSIVE CONTACT WITH THE TURKISH AND GREEK PRIME MINISTERS AS WELL AS WITH OUR MAJOR EUROPEAN ALLIES.

6. AS YOU KNOW, THE GUARANTOR POWERS (THE U.K., GREECE  
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AND TURKEY) MEETING IN GENEVA PRODUCED AN AGREEMENT ON THE MODALITIES OF THE CEASEFIRE, THE ROUGH OUTLINES OF A POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT ON CYPRUS AND AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO PHASED REDUCTION OF FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE ON THE ISLAND IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 353 OF JULY 20. IN ADDITION THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO BEGIN THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT ON

AUGUST 8. DURING THE GENEVA MEETING THE US WAS IN INTENSIVE CONTACT WITH LEADERS FROM BOTH SIDES AND WE TRIED TO PLAY A HELPFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN URGING THE PARTIES TO COME TO A REALISTIC AND PEACEFUL ACCOMMODATION. AS A RESULT OF THESE COMBINED EFFORTS TO REACH A

PEACEFUL SOLUTION I AM HOPEFUL THAT THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN CONVERTED FROM A MILITARY CONFRONTATION INTO A DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION AND THAT PEACE CAN BE PRESERVED IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

7. I EXPECT TO SEE YOU IN A FEW WEEKS AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN NEW YORK AND IN THAT CONNECTION I WONDER WHETHER YOU HAVE HAD ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE CONSULTATION PROCESS WHICH I WROTE TO YOU ABOUT IN MY LETTER OF JUNE 13. IN REFLECTING FURTHER ON THIS MATTER, IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT DURING OUR TALKS IN NEW YORK WE MIGHT LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE FIRST MEETING. THIS WOULD INDICATE THE TOPICS WHICH OUR REPRESENTATIVES MIGHT DISCUSS AS WELL AS THE TIME AND LOCALE. THE MEETING MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN BRASILIA OR WASHINGTON AS YOU PREFER, AND PERHAPS SOMETIME IN OCTOBER WOULD BE GOOD TIMING. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU.

8. I WAS DISTRESSED TO HEAR ABOUT THE EPIDEMIC OF MENINGITIS IN BRAZIL AND HAVE FOLLOWED THE STEPS BEING TAKEN BY OUR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN MAKING AVAILABLE VACCINE FROM OUR LIMITED STOCKS. WITH WARMEST REGARDS. HENRY. END TEXT.

9. PLEASE ADVISE WHEN LETTER DELIVERED. KISSINGER

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